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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the contours of the “on-campus” versus
“off-campus” distinction embedded in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mahoney School District v. B.L. This Article argues that B.L., and the Court’s
broader Tinker doctrine, fail to adequately address modern student speech
issues, especially student speech arising in extracurricular programs and
activities. This Article proposes a two-part legal framework for future
courts to analyze student speech issues in an increasingly digital
post-pandemic world.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has managed to balance two competing First Amendment principles: (1) that students do not “shed” all of their free speech rights at the “schoolhouse gate,”1
and (2) that public school officials have a special interest in regulating certain aspects of student speech that may cause a “material” and “substantial
disruption” to the school environment.2
While the boundary demarcating schools’ heightened authority to regulate student speech “is not constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the school yard[,]”3 since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Tinker v. Des Moines, most of its student speech jurisprudence has hinged
on a fundamental (and outdated)4 presumption: that the student’s speech
occurred on a school’s physical campus, within the context of a traditional

1. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969); see also B.L. ex rel.
Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038
(2021) (“Tinker . . . struck a balance, reaffirming students’ rights but recognizing a limited
zone of heightened governmental authority.”).
2. B.L., 964 F.3d at 184.
3. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(citing Supreme Court first amendment jurisprudence).
4. See, e.g., Sheldon McCurry Stokes, Note, Bracelets and Boobies: B.H. v. Easton
Area School District and the Need for a New Uniform Test in Student Speech Cases, 13 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 530, 532 (2015) (arguing for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a
student speech case to update Tinker doctrine); Lindsay J. Gower, Note, Blue Mountain
School District v. J.S. Ex Rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court Provide Clarification for
Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 710
(2013) (advocating for the Supreme Court to clarify Tinker’s application); Allison Martin,
Comment, Tinkering with the Parameters of Student Free Speech Rights for Online Expression: When Social Networking Sites Knock on the Schoolhouse Gate, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
773, 776 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court needs to clarify application of the Tinker
standard to off-campus internet speech); Aaron J. Hersh, Note, Rehabilitating Tinker: A
Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression
Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1313–1314 (2013) (proposing a modified
application of Tinker to encourage cohesion among the circuit courts).
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school day.5 Accelerated by a global pandemic,6 this presumption has
quickly given way to a new frontier7 of student speech questions, emerging
in novel digital contexts quite different than the traditional in-person school
settings that formed the foundation of the Supreme Court’s Tinker doctrine:
i.e., symbolic speech protesting the Vietnam War in a school building,8 sexual innuendo in a student’s speech during a school assembly,9 censorship in
a school’s printed newspaper,10 and a student banner promoting illegal drug
activity outside of a school-sponsored event.11
In Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Court attempted to bring
the Tinker doctrine into the information age but left most of the heavy work
for future courts.12 In B.L., the Court held, in an 8-1 decision, that a public
school district violated the First Amendment by disciplining a student for
social media posts made online that were vulgar and critical of her high
school cheerleading team, when that speech occurred off-campus, outside
of school hours, and on her own personal cell phone.13 In its decision, the
Court acknowledged that the special interest school officials have in regulating on-campus student speech under Tinker may extend to some, but not

5. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
681 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 280 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007); see also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist.
v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2050 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our cases involving the regulation of student speech have not directly addressed [the off-campus] question.
All those cases involved either in-school speech or speech that was tantamount to in-school
speech. And in those cases, the Court appeared to take it for granted that ‘the special characteristics of the school environment’ justified special rules.” (first citing Morse, 551 U.S.
at 397, 403, 405, 406, n. 2, 408; then citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; and then citing
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)).
6. See generally, COVID-19, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html [https://perma.cc/S8PL-2CCC].
7. B.L., 964 F.3d at 175 (“With new forms of communication have come new frontiers
of regulation, where educators assert the power to regulate online student speech made off
school grounds, after school hours, and without school resources.”).
8. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07.
9. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78.
10. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
11. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
12. Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2063 (2021)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In effect, [the majority] states just one rule: Schools can regulate
speech less often when that speech occurs off campus. It then identifies this case as an
‘example’ and ‘leav[es] for future cases’ the job of developing this new common-law doctrine.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
13. Id. at 2047–48.
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all, areas of speech that occur off-campus.14 While the Court recognized
the relevance of the “on-campus” and “off-campus” distinction,15 it stopped
short of explaining exactly what counts as off-campus speech or even how
ordinary First Amendment principles should apply in off-campus settings.16
Ultimately, B.L. offers little more than guideposts on the opposite ends of
the student-speech spectrum.17 Still, the message from the Court is clear:
regulation of purely off-campus student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns.18
This Article explores the contours of the on-campus versus off-campus
distinction embedded in B.L. Part II begins with a brief history of the First
Amendment student speech doctrine, tracing this distinction throughout the
development of the Court’s Tinker doctrine. Part III builds on Supreme
Court jurisprudence to highlight a body of circuit court caselaw that
emerged in the decade following the turn of the millennium to address
whether Tinker could be applied to off-campus speech that still reached the
“schoolhouse gate.” Part IV analyzes the factual and procedural background in B.L., beginning with the federal district court proceedings and
concluding with analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion. Part V concludes
by proposing a two-part legal framework to resolve student speech cases
post-B.L. and addressing the biggest inconsistency in B.L.—application of
off-campus speech principles in a school’s extra-curricular programs or activities, particularly its sports programs.
I. TINKER DOCTRINE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”19
It is well settled that under the U.S. Constitution, states have a “special”
governmental interest in prescribing and controlling conduct that occurs in
public schools.20 However, by the turn of the twentieth century, the
14. Id. at 2045–46.
15. Id. at 2046–47.
16. Id. at 2047.
17. Id. at 2054–57 (Alito, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 2045.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 393 (1923); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968); see also
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“The role and purpose of the
American public school system were well described by two historians, who stated: ‘[P]ublic
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Supreme Court had recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevented a state from interfering with the liberty rights of
“teacher[s], student[s] and parent[s],”21 and that the Constitution protects all
citizens “against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.”22 Although the “constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,”23 until the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Tinker v. Des

education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.’” (quoting
CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)));
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he public educator nurtures students’
social and moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma of ‘community values.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982))); Mahanoy, 141
S. Ct. at 2059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Cases and treatises from that era reveal that public
schools retained substantial authority to discipline students. As I have previously explained,
that authority was near plenary while students were at school.” (citing Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007)).
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)
(recognizing parents’ liberty interest in choosing their child’s education); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (recognizing children’s liberty interest in
political expression by allowing them to refuse recitation of the pledge of allegiance); Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209–12 (1948) (holding use of public
schools for dissemination of religious lessons violated the first and fourteenth amendments);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (acknowledging teachers’ right to participate in political associations); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 241 (1957) (holding academic and political freedom preserved a university professor’s right to refuse to testify about a guest lecture); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960) (emphasizing the importance of student and teacher freedom to associate); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962) (holding students were not required to take part in daily
prayer at a school); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(stressing the importance of teachers’ first and fourteenth amendment rights in cultivating
well-rounded learning environments); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
205, 211–14 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting the history of the student speech doctrine).
22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (“[Boards of Education] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits
of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.”).
23. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at
682) (commenting on the history of the student speech doctrine post-Tinker).
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Moines, the Court had never squarely addressed a student’s free speech
rights in a public school.24
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In Tinker, a group of high school students planned to wear black armbands with a peace sign to their school as a symbol of their disapproval of
the Vietnam War.25 Soon after, the school’s principal adopted a policy that
students wearing black armbands would be asked to remove them or face
discipline.26 In open defiance of the school’s policy, Mary Beth and John
Tinker wore their black armbands to school and were quickly suspended by
school administrators.27 Parents, on behalf of their minor children, sued the
school district for violation of their children’s First Amendment rights to
free speech.28 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the school’s suspension, holding that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”29 However, the Court
also recognized that student speech within the “schoolhouse” is not absolute. In its holding, the Tinker Court crafted a legal test that balances a
student’s right to free speech with a school’s need to promote an orderly
learning environment for all students.30 Under Tinker, student speech “in
class or out of it,”31 that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” is not protected by the First
Amendment.32 Ultimately, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test continues
to be the leading constitutional analysis in the student speech arena, with
several notable distinctions.33

24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 506.
30. Id. at 512–14.
31. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). Extension of the Court’s holding here is at the heart of
the on-campus versus off-campus distinction. Arguably the Tinker Court’s statement alludes
to student speech rendered outside of the four corners of the in-person classroom (i.e., in the
hallway, in the cafeteria, or on the playing field) but still within a traditional on-campus
in-person school day. Id. at 512–13.
32. Id. at 513.
33. See infra Part II (B–D); see also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141
S. Ct. 2038, 2044–46 (2021) (beginning the Supreme Court’s most recent First Amendment
student-speech analysis with references to Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test).
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B. Bethel School District v. Fraser
Nearly twenty years after Tinker, the Court addressed the scope of a
student’s free speech rights in Bethel School District v. Fraser.34 In Fraser,
a high school student gave a speech to nominate a fellow classmate for a
student government position during a school assembly.35 The speech was
delivered in-person, to 600 members of the student body.36 Throughout the
speech, Fraser repeatedly referred to the candidate through “elaborate
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”37 Following the speech, the school
suspended Fraser for violation of a school rule prohibiting “obscene language” which later prompted a lawsuit against the school district under the
First Amendment.38 The Supreme Court upheld the school’s suspension,
holding that the Constitution did not protect student speech given during a
school assembly that was “indecent,” “vulgar,” or “lewd” and that would
“undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”39 In its holding, the
Court declined to apply Tinker’s substantial disruption test, finding the
purely political and symbolic speech at issue in Tinker distinguishable from
a “pervasive sexual innuendo” that was “plainly offensive to both teachers
and students.”40 However, the Court did acknowledge (at least implicitly)
that if Fraser’s comments had not occurred on-campus during a school assembly, they would have been entitled to First Amendment protection. 41

34. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 677–678.
38. Id. at 678–679.
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id. at 683.
41. See Id. (“The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” (emphasis added)); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007). In analyzing the speech in Morse, the Court
reflected on the speech in Fraser. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05. For the first time, the Court
drew the line between on-campus and off-campus student speech—re-iterating that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings,” but making clear that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech
in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.” Morse, 551
U.S. at 404–05 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83). “In school, however, Fraser’s First
Amendment rights were circumscribed ‘in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.’” Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
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C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years later, the Court decided Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.42 In Hazelwood, a Missouri high school student brought a First
Amendment lawsuit against her school district after her principal removed
portions of an article about student pregnancy and divorce that she wrote
for the school-sponsored print newspaper.43 The Court upheld the school
district’s decision, holding that educators do not run afoul of the First
Amendment by “exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”44 Like
Fraser, the Court distinguished Hazelwood from Tinker, finding a school’s
tolerance of student speech, which just happened to occur at school, markedly different than the promotion or endorsement of student speech in a
school-sponsored forum.45
D. Morse v. Frederick
Finally, in 2007, the Supreme Court refined its student speech doctrine
once more in Morse v. Frederick.46 In Morse, a student was suspended for
refusing a principal’s directive to take down a “large banner” promoting
illegal drug use, that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”47 The student displayed
the banner across the street from the school building, but as part of a
school-sanctioned event, during “normal school hours” within the traditional school day.48 The student filed a First Amendment lawsuit challenging the suspension.49 The Court held that a school district does not violate
the First Amendment by regulating student speech that promotes illegal

42. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
43. Id. at 262–64.
44. Id. at 273.
45. Id. at 270–72.
46. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
47. Id. at 396–97.
48. Id. at 398. Morse arose during the unique backdrop of the 2002 Winter Olympics.
“[T]he Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The torchbearers were to proceed along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS) while school was in session. Petitioner Deborah Morse,
the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay as
an approved social event or class trip. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the
relay from either side of the street. Teachers and administrative officials monitored the students’ actions.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 399.
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drug use at school.50 In upholding the student’s suspension, the Court explicitly rejected his argument that the school lacked the authority to regulate
his speech because it occurred across the street from the school building.51
Rather, the Court found that the event was in fact school-sanctioned: the
school planned the event as a “class trip,” and it was actively supervised by
teachers and administrators.52 The high school band even performed.53 In
this context, the school’s right to regulate speech was clearly warranted.
However, the Court was quick to note that like in Fraser, if the student’s
speech had been rendered off-campus, the speech “would have been protected” by the First Amendment.54
In short, Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse form a predictable
body of case law that balances the progressive ideals of the 1960’s with
traditional notations of discipline and order in traditional public-school settings (i.e., on-campus). Thus, the Tinker doctrine has created several
well-settled rules for the regulation of student speech on-campus: “(1) ‘Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language[;]’ (2) ‘Under [Kuhlmeier], a school may regulate school-sponsored
speech . . . on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern[;]’ and (3)
Under Morse, a school may categorically prohibit speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use . . . .”55 On-campus speech
that falls “outside of these categories” is presumptively subject to analysis
under Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test.56 While the Tinker doctrine
continues to provide a useful framework for on-campus speech, beyond passive references and vague hypotheticals in Fraser and Morse, it did little to
establish any framework for off-campus speech prior to B.L.57
In many ways, the timing of Morse was fortuitous. Morse was decided
in 2007 and the Court would not hear another student speech case for almost

50. Id. at 409–10.
51. Id. at 400–01.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 401.
54. Id. at 404–05 (noting that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected.” (first citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); and then citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser 478, U.S. 675, 682–
83 (1868))).
55. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 436 (M.D. Pa.
2019), aff’d, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (alterations in original) (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)).
56. Id. at 436.
57. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266–
73 (1988).
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fifteen years.58 2007 proved to be an inflection point in a decade that witnessed unprecedented growth in digital communication.59 Since Morse, the
fusion of social media and smart phone technologies have reached a state of
“omnipresence”60 that has fundamentally altered how speech is disseminated. As Part III explains, a body of circuit court precedent emerged following Morse to address this paradigm shift and determine whether
off-campus digital speech, impacting the in-person learning environment,
was actionable under the First Amendment.61
II. CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT (2007–2021)
Although Tinker remained the gold standard for constitutional analysis
of student speech on-campus, whether (and to what extent) Tinker applied
to “speech uttered beyond the schoolhouse gate” continued to be an open
question prior to B.L.62 Circuit court cases decided since Morse yielded no

58. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
59. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO
THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 19–23 (2016). As author Thomas Fieldman explains, 2007 is a critically important year in the understanding of our current tech-drive society and in the history of technology generally. In 2007, Apple launched the first generation
of the iPhone, Facebook and Twitter went global, Google bought Youtube, Kindle and Android were released, and IBM introduced the Watson supercomputer. Id. See Lizzy Gurdus,
Your World Changed Forever in 2007, Get with the Program, Thomas Friedman Says,
CNBC (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/22/your-world-changedforever-in-2007-with-iphone-and-tech-boom-thomas-friedman.html
[https://perma.cc/Y365-FFEM].
60. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 2020),
aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (first citing Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205,
220–21 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring); and then citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder
v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring)).
61. See infra Part III.
62. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 444 (M.D. Pa.
2019), aff’d, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021); see also Snyder,
650 F.3d at 926 (assuming, without deciding, that Tinker applies to off-campus speech);
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (“There is surely a limit
to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully
define that limit here . . . .”); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (“It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when
he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”).
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consistent legal analysis.63 However, three distinct categories of constitutional analysis emerged from the fray.64
In the first category, Tinker was applied to off-campus speech if “it
was reasonably foreseeable” that a student’s off-campus speech would substantially disrupt the school learning environment.65 A second category applied Tinker if the off-campus speech had a sufficient “nexus” to the
school’s “pedagogical interests.”66 Finally, a hodgepodge of circuit courts
applied Tinker to off-campus settings without fully articulating a governing
standard.67 It is this fractured legal landscape from which B.L. emerged.
A. The “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test
The Second and Eighth Circuits addressed off-campus student speech
under Tinker within the context of violent and threatening online student
speech directed at the school community. In Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski
v. Board of Education, an eighth-grade student created an icon for his American Online (AOL) instant messaging account that displayed a “pistol firing
a bullet at a person’s head” with a notation that read “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English teacher.68 The student’s icon was visible to each
of his AOL “buddies,” some of whom were his fellow classmates.69 The
student’s AOL icon was circulated for approximately three weeks.70 The
student was later suspended after images of the icon were captured by another student and forwarded to the school.71 The Second Circuit, applying
Tinker, upheld the student’s suspension, holding that off-campus speech
that “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable risk”72 of “materially and substantially disrupt[ing] the work and discipline of the school[s]” was not
63. This Article is limited to a brief review of circuit court cases from 2007–2021 that
were applicable to the Court’s outcome in B.L. For a comprehensive review of the circuit
split in authority during this time period, see, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Sch.
Bds. Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6–10, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel.
Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (No. 20-255); Brief for Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n and Pa. Principals
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–11, Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (No.
20-255).
64. B.L., 964 F.3d at 186–87.
65. See infra Part III(A).
66. See infra Part III(B).
67. See infra Part III(C).
68. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 36.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 38.
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protected under Tinker.73 In its holding, the Second Circuit had “no doubt”
that the violence depicted in the student’s AOL icon, once made known to
the school, was a foreseeable substantial disruption the learning environment.74
The Eighth Circuit adopted a similar approach in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M.
v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60.75 Like Wisniewski, in D.J.M.,
the speech at issue involved a series of AOL instant messages sent by a
student online, outside of the traditional school day.76 In D.J.M., the student’s messages indicated that he had been “talking about taking a gun to
school” and shooting “everyone he hates [and] then shoot[ing] himself.”77
These messages were forwarded to the school’s principal, who contacted
the police.78 The student was later arrested by law enforcement and suspended by the school district.79 Thereafter, parents and students expressed
concerns about school safety, and the school spent “considerable time dealing with these concerns” to ensure the school’s security.80 Like Wisniewski,
the Eighth Circuit upheld the student’s suspension, finding that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the student’s threatening off-campus speech
would be brought to the attention of the school, and that it would create a
“risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”81
Since Wisniewski and D.J.M, the “reasonably foreseeable” test has also
been extended to non-violent off-campus student speech cases, such as allegations of sexual and racial harassment.82 In the Eighth Circuit, prior to
B.L., this approach was extended to govern all forms of off-campus student
speech.83
73. Id. at 39 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)).
74. Id. at 40.
75. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765–67 (8th Cir. 2011).
76. Id. at 757–60.
77. Id. at 758 (first alteration in original).
78. Id. at 759.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 766.
81. Id. (“[S]tudent creativity and . . . ability . . . can[not] flourish if violence threatens
the school environment.”).
82. See C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1146, 1151 (9th
Cir. 2016); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773, 777–
78 (8th Cir. 2012).
83. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43, 48–52 (2d Cir. 2008)
(denying preliminary injunction and upholding discipline for a student who used an off-campus online platform to urge others to protest the school’s decision to postpone a concert);
S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 777; see also B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d
170, 186 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
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B. The “Nexus” Test
The Fourth Circuit’s approach focuses less on the foreseeability of
off-campus speech reaching the on-campus learning environment and more
on the “nexus” of the off-campus speech to specific pedagogical interests
of the school. The leading circuit case for this mode of analysis is Kowalski
v. Berkeley County Schools.84 In Kowalski, a high school senior created a
MySpace page entitled “S.A.S.H.” that was used by fellow classmates as an
online forum to verbally attack another student, “Shay N.”85 Kowalski invited approximately one-hundred of her MySpace friends (many of whom
attended her high school) to join the webpage.86 At least one of the students
accessed the MySpace page on a school-owned computer during the course
of the school day.87 Thereafter, Shay’s parents filed a harassment complaint
against Kowalski with the school.88 Shay also missed class time because
she “fe[lt] uncomfortable about sitting in class with students who had posted
comments about her on the MySpace webpage.”89
Subsequently, the school district suspended Kowalski for her online
comments under its existing “Harassment, Bullying, and Intimidation Policy.”90 The Fourth Circuit found that the prevention of harassment was an
important pedagogical interest for the school and that harassment could
have the effect of “caus[ing] victims to become depressed and anxious, to
be afraid to go to school, and to have thoughts of suicide.”91 Thus, schools
generally “must be able to prevent and punish harassment and bullying in
order to provide a safe school environment . . . .”92 In that light, the Fourth
Circuit found that Kowalski’s speech, although rendered “metaphysical[ly]” off-campus, through an online medium, still had a sufficient
“nexus” to the school’s “pedagogical interests” (i.e., prevention of harassment) to justify the school’s suspension.93
84. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
85. Id. at 567. The Fourth Circuit found that there was disagreement as to what the
acronym “S.A.S.H.” represented. In her deposition, Kowalski testified that “S.A.S.H.”
meant “Students Against Sluts Herpes” while another student testified that “S.A.S.H.” meant
“Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring directly to another student at the school. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 568–69.
91. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 573. In that regard, the Fourth Circuit found that the school officials were
“carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.” Id.
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C. Other Circuit Court Approaches
Finally, several circuits have applied Tinker in off-campus speech
cases without pronouncing a global legal standard. In Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board, the Fifth Circuit applied Tinker to uphold the suspension of a student for disseminating “[a] rap recording containing threats to,
and harassment and intimidation of, two teachers” that was “intentionally
direct[ed] at the school community[.]”94 Similarly, in Wynar v. Douglas
County School District, the Ninth Circuit upheld a student’s suspension in
the face of evidence of “an identifiable threat of school violence.”95
In sum, several circuit court approaches to handling off-campus student speech emerged in the wake of Morse.96 Although the mechanics of
the opinions differed, the results were the same: Tinker was extended deep
into realms of off-campus digital student speech to combat threatening and
harassing behavior impacting the school’s learning environment.97 As Part
IV displays, the facts in B.L. do not involve threatening or harassing conduct, and now serve as an exemplar for the type of non-violent, non-threatening off-campus student speech entirely beyond the reach of school officials under the First Amendment.98
III. MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT V. B.L.
A. Relevant Factual Background
In the spring of 2016, a public school student made several social media posts on her personal Snapchat account that were critical of her high
school cheerleading team.99 At the time, B.L. was a freshman at Mahanoy
Area High School, which is a part of the Mahanoy Area School District,

94. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Dist., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
95. Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining
to “divine and impose a global standard for . . . off-campus speech[]”).
96. See supra Part II (D).
97. Id. Cf. supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (2021).
99. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432–33 (M.D.
Pa. 2019), aff’d, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (“Snapchat is a social
media application for smartphones that allows users to send private text, photo, and video
messages to other users—but these messages are limited in duration, cannot be accessed
from the web, and can only be viewed temporarily.” (citing B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy
Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d. 607, 610 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2017))).
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located outside of Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania.100 During her freshman
year in high school, B.L. was a member of the junior varsity cheerleading
squad.101 At the end of her freshman year, B.L. tried out for the school’s
varsity cheerleading squad.102 Student athletes trying out for the cheerleading team were required to agree to the team’s Cheerleading Rules (Rules)
which “would apply to her if [B.L.] made the [cheerleading] squad
again.”103 The Rules stated, among other things, that Mahanoy High School
cheerleaders would “have respect for [their] school, coaches, teachers, other
cheerleaders and teams. Remember you are representing your school when
at games, fundraisers, and other events. Good sportsmanship will be enforced, this includes foul language and inappropriate gestures.”104
The Rules put cheerleaders on notice that there would be “no toleration
of any negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or
coaches placed on the internet.”105 Both B.L. and her mother reviewed the
Rules and “signed a document acknowledging B.L. would be bound by
them.”106 Following tryouts, cheerleading coaches decided to keep B.L. on
the junior varsity cheerleading squad for her sophomore year, while an incoming freshman was placed on the varsity team.107
Frustrated by her coaches’ decision, over the weekend B.L. made two
social media posts on Snapchat.108 The first post was a selfie taken outside
of the Cocoa Hut, a local convenience store and student hangout, where she
and a friend “pos[ed] in street clothes” with their “middle fingers raised.”109
The Snapchat post included the following text at the top of the photo: “fuck
school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”110 B.L. later made another
Snapchat post that read: “Love how me and [my friend] get told we need a
year of jv before we make varsity but that[] doesn’t matter to anyone
else?”111 “The caption also contained an upside-down smiley-face
emoji.”112 Once the social media posts were published online, they were
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 432–33.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2021).
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viewable by B.L.’s 250 Snapchat friends, many of whom attended her high
school, and some of whom were fellow members of the cheerleading
team.113 One of B.L.’s Snapchat friends (also a cheerleader at the high
school) took screenshots of B.L.’s Snapchat posts and forwarded them to
the cheerleading team’s coach.114
Following the weekend, news about B.L.’s social media posts began
to circulate around the high school. Several cheerleaders and non-cheerleaders approached the school’s coaches to express their concerns about the
posts.115 Some of these individuals were “visibly upset.”116 Although chatter about B.L.’s online posts “persisted during an Algebra class taught by
one of the two coaches,” discussion about the posts took up “at most, 5 to
10 minutes” of class time.117 Ultimately, Mahanoy’s cheerleading coaches
decided to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for one school year for
violating cheerleading team Rules.118 Subsequently, B.L.’s parents sought
review of the coaches’ decision with the school’s principal, athletic director,
as well as the school district’s superintendent and Board of Education, “to
no avail.”119
B. Federal District Court Lawsuit
B.L., by and through her parents, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the Mahanoy Area School District in Pennsylvania federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
113. B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433.
114. Id. The cheerleader who forwarded B.L.’s screenshots to the coach was the coach’s
daughter. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043, 2047–48. The court record in B.L. indicated that during the cheerleading coaches’ depositions, she was asked directly if she had “any reason to
think that this particular incident would disrupt class or school activities other than the fact
that kids kept asking . . . about it,” to which “she responded simply, ‘No.’” Id. at 2048.
118. B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433. The District Court found as fact that “[e]ven though
electronic squabbling amongst cheerleaders at the High School ‘is a fairly typical occurrence,’ the coaches felt the need to enforce the Rules against B.L. ‘to “avoid chaos” and
maintain a “team-like environment.”’” Id. However, “[t]he cheerleading coaches would not
have suspended B.L. from the team if her Snaps had not referenced cheerleading.” Id.
119. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2020),
aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (“Although school authorities agreed B.L. could try out for the
team again the next year, they upheld the coaches’ decision for that year.”); see also B.L.,
376 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“The School Board decided that it should not get involved in the
minutiae of extracurricular activities, and that coaches must be permitted to hold students
accountable for their actions.”).
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enjoining the school district from suspending B.L. from the cheerleading
team for off-campus speech protected by the First Amendment.120 The district court granted B.L.’s prayer for injunctive relief and entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the school district.121 Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of B.L.122
At summary judgment, the school district advanced two arguments in
support of its regulation of B.L.’s social media posts.123 First, B.L. waived
her First Amendment rights when she agreed to the cheerleading team’s
Rules.124 The district court acknowledged that a party can waive its constitutional rights, but that such a waiver must be “voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent . . . shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.”125 To meet this
heightened standard, at least in the Third Circuit, the parties must have equal
bargaining power in the negotiation and advice of legal counsel to boot.126
In this case, the district court found that there simply was not sufficient evidence in the record to establish a lawful constitutional waiver.127 Indeed,
“neither B.L. nor her mother had bargaining equality with the coaches or
the school; the Cheerleading Rules were not subject to negotiation; and B.L.
and her mother were not represented by counsel when they agreed B.L.
would abide by the Rules.”128 Moreover, the district court found that “conditioning extracurricular participation on a waiver of a constitutional right
is coercive.”129 Thus, B.L. had not waived her First Amendment rights
through a waiver in the cheerleading team’s Rules.

120. B.L., 964 F.3d at 176; see also B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433; B.L. ex rel. Levy v.
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
121. B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (citing B.L., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 607).
122. Id. at 445.
123. Id. at 437–38.
124. Id. at 437.
125. Id. (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).
126. Id. (first citing Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d 1988)
(providing Third Circuit waiver standard); and then citing to Yoder v. Uni. Of Louisville,
526 F. App’x 537, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing from Sixth Circuit waiver standard)).
127. Id. at 437–38.
128. Id. at 437. The demanding and exacting scrutiny applied here would likely doom
many, if not all, athletic codes of conduct. Even with expert draftsmanship, almost no school
official would presume that a parent must retain legal counsel to review an athletic code of
conduct for it to be enforceable.
129. Id. (first citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); and then citing Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D.N.J. 1986)).
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Second, the school district argued that it could still regulate B.L.’s
off-campus speech under Tinker, or in the alternative, that it could discipline
B.L. for B.L.’s vulgar speech under Fraser.130 The district court rejected
both arguments.131 The district court held, under existing Third Circuit
precedent, that a school district could not punish a student under Tinker for
off-campus speech that was “merely profane.”132 Regardless, the school
district had not demonstrated that B.L.’s Snapchat posts caused a “substantial disruption” to the school environment required to trigger Tinker.133
Moreover, the district court made clear that Fraser’s exception for “vulgar”
or “lewd” student speech did not extend to off-campus speech, outside of
school hours.134
C. Third Circuit Appeal
The Mahanoy Area School District appealed the district court decision
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.135 The Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, finding that Mahanoy’s suspension of B.L. from the
cheerleading team for off-campus speech violated the First Amendment.136
However, the Third Circuit departed from the district court’s rationale, offering a much broader, bright-line rule: Tinker does not apply to any
off-campus student speech.137
As a threshold matter, the Third Circuit began its analysis by addressing the on-campus/off-campus distinction.138 The Third Circuit defined
off-campus speech as “speech that is outside school-owned, -operated,
or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the
school’s imprimatur.”139 The Third Circuit held, unequivocally, that B.L.’s
speech, “created . . . away from campus, over the weekend, and without
school resources, . . . shared . . . on a social media platform unaffiliated

130. Id. at 441.
131. Id. at 441–42.
132. Id. at 441 (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932–
33 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that a “school cannot punish a student for off-campus
speech that is merely profane”).
133. Id. at 442–43.
134. Id. at 441.
135. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d,
141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
136. Id. at 175.
137. Id. at 189.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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with the school” constituted off-campus speech.140 Thus, the primary inquiry with the Third Circuit was whether B.L. could be disciplined by her
school for her off-campus speech.141
The Third Circuit surveyed a mixed body of Circuit Court precedent,142
ultimately adopting its own free speech test. In fashioning a bright-line rule,
the Third Circuit emphasized the “distinct advantages” of providing
“up-front clarity to students and school officials” over a fact-based,
case-by-case analysis.143 In its opinion, a case-by-case approach was
fraught with too much uncertainty in determining whether, and to what extent, ever-changing online speech actually impacts the school’s learning environment.144 However, “a test based on whether the speech occurs in a
context owned, controlled, or sponsored by the school [was] much more
easily applied and understood” by stakeholders.145 Although the outcome
for the parties remained the same, ironically, the Third Circuit’s opinion
furthered an existing circuit split, and ultimately prompted review by the
United States Supreme Court.146
D. Supreme Court Opinion
Nearly four years after B.L.’s Snapchat posts were first published on
the internet, the Supreme Court granted the Mahanoy Area School District’s
petition for certiorari.147 For the first time, the Court had chosen to address
the Tinker doctrine in a contemporary off-campus setting.148 With the backdrop of Snapchat as a speech medium, and the nature of the speech at issue
(i.e., “F&*k Cheer”), media interest in B.L. was fervent.149
140. Id. at 180.
141. Id. at 181.
142. Id. at 186–87; see also supra Part III, n.63 (examining the Circuit Court split in the
application of Tinker to off-campus settings following Morse).
143. B.L., 964 F.3d at 189.
144. Id. at 196–97 (Ambro, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 190 (“[This] clarity benefits students, who can better understand their rights,
but it also benefits school administrators, who can better understand the limits of their authority and channel their regulatory energies in productive but lawful ways.”).
146. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 976 (2021) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
147. Id.
148. See Parts II and III supra.
149. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Cheerleader’s Vulgar Message Prompts a First Amendment Showdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/us/supreme-court-schools-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/S4JK-9AW7]; Ian Millhiser, The
Supreme Court’s “Cursing Cheerleader” Case Could Reshape Student’s First Amendment
Rights, VOX (Apr. 22, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/4/22/22394121/suprem
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1. Majority Opinion
A necessary starting point for the Court’s majority was the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion below. Previously, the Third Circuit had
held that student speech occurring on-campus could be regulated consistent
with Tinker, but that all student speech occurring off-campus was categorically barred from regulation under the First Amendment.150 The Supreme
Court abandoned the Third Circuit’s rigid “all-or-nothing” approach, acknowledging the complex nature of the on-campus versus off-campus distinction.151 In dicta, the Court noted several general areas of potential
off-campus speech proffered by legal counsel that might justify regulation
by school officials.152 These areas include, but are not limited to: “[1] serious or severe bullying or harassment targeting particular individuals; [2]
threats aimed at teachers or other students; [3] the failure to follow rules
concerning lessons[;] [4] the writing of papers[;] [5] the use of computers,
or participation in other online school activities; and [6] breaches of school
security devices . . . .”153 Rather than adopting a formal definition for
off-campus speech,154 or developing a “broad, highly general First Amendment rule” to determine the framework of off-campus speech, the Court primarily focused on the fundamentals necessitating the regulation of student
speech in the first place: orderly and effective instruction.155
To that end, the majority articulated three features of off-campus
speech that, in its opinion, diminished the need for the same type of First
Amendment “leeway” to regulate on-campus speech.156 First, public
e-court-cursing-cheerleader-first-amendment-bl-mahanoy-brandi-levy-student-free-speechcampus [https://perma.cc/VC29-D9GA]; The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (CBS Television Broadcast June 23, 2021).
150. See B.L., 964 F.3d at 180.
151. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021) (“Unlike
the Third Circuit, we do not believe the special characteristics that give schools additional
license to regulate student speech always disappear when a school regulates speech that takes
place off campus.”).
152. Id.
153. Id. Counsel for B.L. conceded in written arguments to the Court that many areas of
off-campus speech could still be regulated by a school. See Id. These areas included, speech
occurring “over school laptops or on a school’s website; speech taking place during remote
learning [activities]; and communications to school e-mail accounts or phones.” Id. Although this is mere dicta, these areas are likely to serve as fodder for parties in future cases.
154. See B.L., 964 F.3d at 178–80 (examining the on-campus versus off-campus distinction within the context of Supreme Court and circuit court precedent, concluding that B.L.’s
snapchat posts were made off-campus).
155. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045–47.
156. Id. at 2046.
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schools rarely stand in loco parentis for students when speech occurs
off-campus.157 Thus, parents (and not schools) serve the primary role of
disciplinarians responsible for a child’s off-campus conduct.158 Second, in
our democratic society, adolescents are full-time students, and a large part
of their daily life occurs on a school’s campus.159 Additional regulation of
off-campus student speech, combined with regulation of on-campus speech,
would be tantamount to regulating all the speech a student utters in a
twenty-four-hour day.160 Finally, in the Court’s opinion, schools are the
“nurseries of democracy,” tasked with ensuring a well-educated populous.161 In that sense, a school’s primary speech interest is to promote “the
‘marketplace of ideas’” and protecting, rather than suppressing, unpopular
student speech that occurs off-campus.162 “Taken together . . . the leeway
the First Amendment grants to schools in light of their special characteristics [on-campus] is diminished” when the speech occurs off-campus.163
With these principles in mind, the Court found that the speech in B.L.
simply did not fall within the purview of regulation by the school for several
reasons. First, the school did not stand in loco parentis for speech made by
B.L. off-campus, over the weekend at a local student hangout.164 Nor was
there sufficient evidence that “B.L.’s parents had delegated . . . control of
B.L.’s behavior at the Cocoa Hut” to the school.165 Second, the record reflected little to no actual disruption at the school, much less the “substantial
disruption” required to trigger Tinker.166 Finally, the Court did not find persuasive the school’s speculative “concern for [cheerleading] team morale”
as a basis for B.L.’s team suspension.167 Without more, the Court found
these interests insufficient to “overcome the right to freedom of expression”
at the heart of the First Amendment.168

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2047.
165. Id. As to the substance of the speech, the court acknowledged its contents were
vulgar but that it “encompassed a message . . . of B.L.’s irritation with, and criticism of, the
school and cheerleading communities” to which she was a part. Id. The Court also found
that the school had not sought to regulate vulgarity outside of the classroom. Id.
166. Id. at 2047–48.
167. Id. at 2048.
168. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
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2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, drafted a concurring opinion
that added gloss to the majority’s holding and offered additional guidance
to the on-campus and off-campus distinction.169 The concurrence agreed
with the central holding of the majority: namely, that “the First Amendment
permits public schools to regulate some student speech that does not occur
on school premises during the regular school day” and that “courts should
be ‘skeptical’ about the constitutionality of the regulation of [off-campus]
speech.”170 However, the concurrence took a deeper dive into the principles
buttressing the majority’s ultimate holding.171
In Justice Alito’s opinion, the true underlying question was: “[w]hy
does the First Amendment ever allow the free-speech rights of public school
students to be restricted to a greater extent than the rights of other juveniles
who do not attend a public school?”172 The answer—a parent’s “consent,
either express or implied.”173 Ultimately for the concurrence, the need for
a public school to regulate any aspect of student speech relied on the underlying theory that “by enrolling a child in a public school, parents consent on
behalf of the child to the relinquishment of some of the child’s free-speech
rights.”174
With those principles in mind, Justice Alito examined several areas
where student speech could certainly be regulated. Examples included,
“standard classroom instruction,” and “periods when students are in school
but are not in class,” such as “when they are walking in a hall, eating lunch,
congregating outside before the school day starts, or waiting for a bus after
school” (i.e., on-campus speech).175
A school’s regulation of off-campus speech is quite different and depends on a multi-factor analysis.176 However, for Justice Alito the central
factor was simply “whether parents who enroll their children in a public
school can reasonably be understood to have delegated to the school the

169. Id. at 2048–59 (Alito, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 2049 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. See Id. at 2050–52 (Alito, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 2049–50 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 2051 (Alito, J., concurring).
174. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 2052 (Alito, J., concurring).
176. See Id. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The degree to which enrollment in a public
school can be regarded as a delegation of authority over off-campus speech depends on the
nature of the speech and the circumstances under which it occurs.”).
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authority to regulate the speech in question.”177 In certain off-campus categories, it can be readily understood that a parent has consented for their
child’s speech to be regulated.178 Examples might include, “online instruction at home, assigned essays or other homework . . . transportation to and
from school . . . . school trips, school sports and other extracurricular activities . . . and after-school programs for students who would otherwise be
without adult supervision during that time.”179 This category would also
include “[a]busive speech that occurs while students are walking to and
from school.”180
On the opposite end of the student speech spectrum lies a category of
off-campus student speech “beyond the regulatory authority of a public
school.”181 This area includes “speech that is not expressly and specifically
directed at the school, school administrators, teachers, or fellow students
and that addresses matters of public concern, including sensitive subjects
like politics, religion, and social relations.”182 Between these “two extremes” of potential off-campus speech, Justice Alito identified (without
deciding) several other categories highlighted by the majority, such as
threatening comments and harassment of other students and teachers, which
had given rise to litigation in circuit courts following Morse.183 Ultimately,
because the facts of B.L. did not require foray into any of these categories,
they were not critically examined by either the concurrence or the majority.184
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas penned the lone dissent in B.L. In his dissent, Justice
Thomas scolded the majority for offering an opinion “untethered from any
textual or historical foundation”185 and for leaving unaddressed the crux of
the modern issue with Tinker: “[H]ow does a court decide if speech is on
or off campus?”186 In his dissent, Justice Thomas opined that the scope of
a school’s authority to regulate off-campus student speech should begin

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2055 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2056 (Alito, J., concurring); see supra Part III.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2057–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2061 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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with the understanding of student speech at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.187 In his opinion, from a historical perspective, the history of the student speech doctrine supports a school having wide latitude
to regulate off-campus speech “so long as it has a proximate tendency to
harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs.”188 Thus, because
B.L.’s off-campus speech was offered, at least in part, to “degrade” her
cheerleading coaches in front of classmates and teammates, her speech had
a “direct and immediate tendency to . . . subvert the [cheerleading coach’s]
authority,” and was subject to discipline by the coach.189
Justice Thomas also noted the importance of B.L.’s voluntary participation in an extracurricular program, a fact that was given “little apparent
significance” by the majority.190 In his opinion, schools have more authority “over off-campus speech . . . when students participate in extracurricular
programs,” because these students have a “greater potential” to harm an extracurricular program through their speech.191 For example, a “profanity-laced” social media post, critical of the football team does much more
harm when published by the quarterback of the football team than a regular
member of the student body.192 Thus, under Justice Thomas’s rule, courts
should first look to the “effect of speech, not its location” when determining
whether a student’s speech is subject discipline.193
All told, the Court’s opinion in B.L. recognizes a distinction between
on-campus and off-campus student speech. B.L. does not categorically prohibit courts from applying a Tinker analysis to off-campus student
speech.194 Nor does it compel the application of Tinker to off-campus
speech.195 While the B.L. Court demarcated the outer boundaries of
187. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
188. Id. at 2061 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 120 (1859)).
190. Id. at 2062. But see B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d
429, 437–38 (M.D. Pa. 2019); B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170,
182 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (providing a thorough discussion of B.L.’s
voluntary participation in the extracurricular activity).
191. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2058 (Alito, J., concurring).
194. See id. at 2045 (“[W]e do not now set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment
rule stating just what counts as ‘off campus’ speech and whether or how ordinary First
Amendment standards must give way off campus to a school’s special need to prevent, e.g.,
substantial disruption of learning-related activities or the protection of those who make up a
school community.”).
195. See id.
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off-campus speech that could be regulated by school officials, the Court’s
opinion stops short of addressing the myriad of novel speech questions public school districts continue to face.
What sets B.L. apart from other Tinker doctrine cases is the lack of a
true disruption to the learning environment. Indeed, there was near universal agreement among all three B.L. courts, including the majority, concurrence, and dissent in the Supreme Court, that there simply was no evidence
of a substantial disruption in B.L.196 Had the nature of B.L.’s off-campus
speech been more akin to the threats in Winieski or the harassment in Kowalski, perhaps the Court would have felt compelled to chart new Tinker territory with greater zeal. Nevertheless, as Part V argues, a deeper analysis is
still necessary for future courts to fully address modern student speech issues left unresolved by B.L.197
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court did not clearly define the parameters of on-campus
and off-campus speech in B.L., leaving public school officials to face novel
and modern speech issues with little guidance. This Part offers a two-part
approach for future courts to navigate emerging student speech questions
post-B.L. and concludes by briefly addressing the biggest question mark
from the Court’s opinion—the regulation of student speech in (or relating
to) extra-curricular activities, particularly sports programs.
A. Two-Part Framework
The first question for any court seeking to resolve a student speech
issue post-B.L. is: Was the speech rendered by the student in a traditional
on-campus setting (i.e., at the brick-and-mortar school building, during a
traditional school day)? If the answer to Question #1 is “yes,” then a traditional Tinker analysis should still be employed.198 If the answer to Question
#1 is “no,” courts should consider the speech off-campus speech and ask a
second question: Did the off-campus speech occur under circumstances
where the parent can be said to have consented for the student’s speech to
be regulated?199 If the answer to Question #2 is “yes,” then the off-campus
speech is seemingly interchangeable with traditional on-campus speech and
196.
ing).
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 2044; id. at 2056 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., dissentSee id. at 2059 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id. at 2044–45; id. at 2057 (Alito, J., concurring); see also supra Part II (D).
See id. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring).
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can likely still be resolved under the same traditional Tinker analysis as
Question #1.200 However, if the answer to Question #2 is “no,” then courts
may now presume after B.L. that this type of speech is beyond the regulation
of school officials, with two notable exceptions.201 In two special circumstances, such as threatening speech and speech that amounts to “serious or
severe” harassment or bullying of other students or staff members, courts
must look deeper into the nature and the impact of the off-campus speech,
(either realized or reasonably forecasted) to determine if a student can still
be disciplined under the First Amendment.202
1. Was the Student Speech Rendered in a Traditional On-Campus
Setting?
Under Question #1, if the student’s speech occurred within a traditional on-campus setting, then a court should examine whether the speech
can be categorically regulated under Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse, and if
not, a Tinker “substantial disruption” test should still be applied.203 For example, speech rendered at the school, during in-class instruction or during
periods where students are in school but not in class, such as “walking in a
hall, eating lunch, congregating outside before the school day starts, or waiting for a bus after school,” still fits squarely into on-campus activity following B.L.204 While the physical location of the speech (i.e., in-person and on
a school’s campus) is still a natural starting point for this free speech analysis, it is not entirely dispositive given advances in modern technology and
hybrid distance learning models.205 However, if the speech is not clearly
200. See id. (Alito, J., concurring) (“The imperatives that justify the regulation of student
speech while in school—the need for orderly and effective instruction and student protection—apply more or less equally to these off-premises activities.”).
201. Id. at 2046 (“Given the many different kinds of off-campus speech, the different
potential school-related and circumstance-specific justifications, and the differing extent to
which those justifications may call for First Amendment leeway, we can, as a general matter,
say little more than this: Taken together, these three features of much off-campus speech
mean that the leeway the First Amendment grants to schools in light of their special characteristics is diminished.”).
202. Id. at 2045.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 2052 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“[Students] cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal
views on the school premises—whether ‘in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969))).
205. Distance education and remote learning have increased at a rapid pace out of necessity due to COVID-19. See generally Cathy Li & Farah Lalani, The COVID-19 Pandemic
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within the boundaries of a traditional on-campus setting, courts should consider the speech off-campus speech and conduct a multi-factor analysis under Question #2 to determine whether the off-campus conduct can still be
regulated under the First Amendment.
2. If the Speech Occurred Off-Campus, Did It Occur Under
Circumstances Where the Parent Can Be Said to Have
Consented for the Student’s Speech to Be Regulated?
The scope of student speech occurring off-campus is more complex.
For speech occurring off-campus to be actionable, many factors should be
considered by courts, including the physical location of the student, the age
of the student, and the context of the speech.206 While future litigants can
expect the three “features” of student speech articulated in B.L. to be prominent in any future court’s decision, the central question for courts will be:
“Whether parents who enroll their children in a public school can reasonably be understood to have delegated to the school the authority to regulate
the speech in question[?]”207 Although the actual degree of delegation given
by a parent will vary from case-to-case, the more the facts bear out that a
parent has consented for their child to be disciplined for speech made
off-campus, the more likely it will be to fall within a traditional Tinker analysis.208

Has Changed Education Forever. This Is How, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://w
ww.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-education-global-covid19-online-digital-lea
rning/ [https://perma.cc/6FX8-8ZHF]. An unprecedented amount of federal dollars flowed
to States and local school districts during the COVID-19 pandemic. See American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021, Pub L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 181 (2020). One of the many
things that public schools can use federal CARES Act and American Rescue Plan Act dollars
on is to enhance online learning and purchase educational technology. See U.S DEPT. OF
EDUC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL
EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS GOVERNOR’S EMERGENCY EDUCATION RELIEF PROGRAMS
41–41 (2021)https://oese.ed.gov/files/2021/05/ESSER.GEER_.FAQs_5.26.21_745
AM_FINALb0cd6833f6f46e03ba2d97d30aff953260028045f9ef3b18ea602db4b32b1d99.p
df[https://perma.cc/9JEQ-BEMP]; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/american-rescue-plan-act-of-2021.aspx [https://perma.cc/NY7Q-NWE2]. These
factors will continue to have a residual effect on the availability and demand for distance
learning platforms for years to come.
206. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046.
207. Id. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
208. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
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A helpful analogy is to think of student speech on a spectrum.209 As
Justice Alito articulated in his concurrence, on one end of the spectrum,
several areas of off-campus speech are seemingly interchangeable with
on-campus speech and should still lend themselves to the traditional Tinker
analysis.210 Examples might include: assigned essays, speech occurring in
online or remote instruction,211 on “school trips, school sports, and other
extracurricular activities that may take place after regular school hours or
off school premises, and after school programs,” as well as “[a]busive
speech that occurs while students are walking to and from school.” 212 In
each of these areas, if the speech was made while the student was participating in a school’s programs or activities, it would seem to be a direct extension of the school’s on-campus environment, where the school is standing in loco parentis, regardless of temporal location, and still within the
scope of the Tinker doctrine.213
On the opposite end of the spectrum are areas of student speech “almost always beyond the regulatory authority of a public school.”214 These
areas include, off-campus speech that is “not expressly and specifically directed at the school, school administrators, teachers, or fellow students and
that addresses matters of public concern[.]”215 This could “includ[e] sensitive subjects like politics, religion, and social relations[,]” as well as speech
that is merely unpopular, or offensive, intemperate, or crude.216 It could
also include “vulgar” speech and even the promotion of illegal drugs, which
were subject to regulation in Fraser and Morse when rendered on-campus,

209. Id. at 2055 (Alito, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring).
211. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). The Court and the parties seemed to agree that most
speech made within the context of online or remote learning platforms, although occurring
off-campus, could still be treated interchangeably with traditional on-campus speech. However, school officials must take special care to recognize the subtle nuances that physical
distancing through an online or remote platform might add, or takeaway, from a substantial
disruption analysis.
212. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). The obvious inconsistency in the Court’s holding here is
B.L herself. B.L.’s speech, although made off-campus, outside of school hours, on her own
personal cell phone, prior to the start of the cheerleading season, to some degree, was directly
related to her participation in the school’s cheerleading program.
213. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2055 (Alito, J. concurring).
215. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2055–56 (Alito, J., concurring). The speech in Fraser and Morse, if rendered
under these circumstances off campus, would fall into this category.
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but likely to be permissible off-campus.217 These categories of off-campus
speech, without more, will likely fall outside the regulation of school officials. As B.L. illustrates, speech rendered on a personal device, via private
messaging or personal social media platforms, outside of school hours, and
not directly as part of the school’s program or activity, is particularly likely
to fall outside the purview of school regulation.218
Furthermore, the Court made clear that parents, not schools, are the
primary regulators of off-campus speech.219 School officials should keep
this principle in mind when reviewing messages forwarded by employees,
coaches, students, parents, and community members regarding a student’s
off-campus speech.220 The Court’s carte blanche deference to custodial parents as regulators of speech inherently conflicts with renewed public interest
in school administration and a growing sense that K-12 and higher education institutions (not just parents) must hold students accountable for their
digital speech, in some cases, regardless of the First Amendment implications.221

217. See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 435–36
(M.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021); see also
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2056 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has held that these rights
extend to speech that is couched in vulgar and offensive terms.”) (first citing Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); then citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); then citing
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); then citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); and then citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)).
218. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047.
219. Id. at 2046; id. at 2053 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[P]arents, not the State, have the
primary authority and duty to raise, educate and, form the character of their children.” (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972))).
220. See id. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring).
221. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
(2017) (advocating for schools to have more autonomy for speech-control, relying on an
“effect” driven analysis rather than the current “location” driven one); Manny Fernandez &
Richard Pérez-Peña, As Two Oklahoma Students are Expelled for Racist Chant, Sigma Alpha
Epsilon Vows Wider Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/11/us/university-of-oklahoma-sigma-alpha-epsilon-racist-fraternity-video.html
[https://perma.cc/8P78-WE4J] (stating that the University of Oklahoma expelled two members of Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity after they led a racist chant which was recorded on
video and sparked outrage across the country); Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, ‘Voluntary’ Departures:
the New Expulsion?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2019/01/28/u-oklahoma-students-racist-video-departure-prompt-first-amendmentquestions [https://perma.cc/R7SD-UMMB] (evaluating whether public universities violate
the First Amendment when they give students an ultimatum either to voluntarily withdraw
from school or face expulsion) (“If officials at Oklahoma had urged the women, even gently,
to leave the institution, it could have violated their free speech rights, experts say.”).
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The difficult cases for courts will lie somewhere in-between the opposite ends of the B.L. spectrum.222 To be sure, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility that Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test might still be applied
in some cases to off-campus speech.223 Again, Tinker applies to student
speech “in class or out of it” if it “materially” and “substantially” disrupts
the learning environment.224 Although the Supreme Court declined to provide an exhaustive list, two specific areas of off-campus speech that might
prove to be actionable under the First Amendment include student comments amounting to “threats aimed at teachers or other students,” as well as
“serious or severe bullying or harassment” targeting “school administrators, teachers, or fellow students.”225
For several reasons, these two categories of off-campus speech—
threats and severe bullying and harassment—provide the best argument for
a modest carve-out to B.L.’s general limitation on the regulation of off-campus student speech.226 First, both the majority and concurrence in B.L.
acknowledged that a “school’s regulatory interests remain significant” in
these two specific areas of student speech.227 Second, as Part III explained,
a significant body of circuit court precedent already exists addressing these
two categories of off-campus speech.228 Finally, the Court failed to critically examine either the “nexus” or “foreseeability” tests adopted by Second, Fifth, and Fourth Circuits prior to B.L., and only explicitly disagreed
with the Third Circuit’s “all or nothing” approach to off-campus student

222. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2056–57 (Alito, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 2045; id. at 2049 (Alito, J., concurring).
224. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis added); see
also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting
that it is “well established” that the boundary separating a schools’ heightened authority to
regulate student speech “is not constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the
school yard.”).
225. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045, 2055; see also supra Part IV (C–D).
226. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045–47.
227. See id. at 2045 (“The school’s regulatory interests remain significant in some
off-campus circumstances. The parties’ briefs, and those of amici, list several types of
off-campus behavior that may call for school regulation. These include serious or severe
bullying or harassment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed at teachers or other
students[.]”); id. at 2057 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Perhaps the most difficult category involves
criticism or hurtful remarks about other students. Bullying and severe harassment are serious
(and age-old) problems, but these concepts are not easy to define with the precision required
for a regulation of speech.” (citing Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 240 F.3d 200,
206–07 (3d Cir. 2001))).
228. See supra Part III.
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speech.229 For now, these approaches lay dormant and the singular guidepost for off-campus student speech in the Supreme Court is B.L. To create
separate entry points on the student-speech spectrum and survive First
Amendment scrutiny, school districts will need to distinguish their case
from B.L. and harmonize the facts of their case with existing circuit court
precedent.
B. Application of B.L. in Extracurricular Activities and Sports
Following B.L., one of the most difficult areas of student speech for
courts to reconcile will be off-campus speech that intersects with extra-curricular activities, particularly school sports. In one part of B.L., the Court
conceded that participation in extra-curricular activities, off school premises and outside of school hours, may give rise for the need to regulate student speech (although not in B.L.).230 The Court also based much of its
rationale on whether a parent consented for their child’s speech to be regulated off-campus, something that would typically occur, at least implicitly,
through participation in an extra-curricular activity.231 Still, Justice Alito
asserted it was “not reasonable to infer that [the parent] gave the school the
authority to regulate [the child’s] choice of language when she was off
school premises and not engaged in any school activity.”232
This conclusion conflicts with other material facts in B.L.’s court record. To start, both the student and her parent acknowledged before cheerleading tryouts that she would abide by the cheerleading team’s Rules,
which required, among other things, that all cheerleaders show “‘respect for
[their] school, coaches, . . . [and] other cheerleaders’; avoid ‘foul language
and inappropriate gestures’; and refrain from sharing ‘negative information
regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaches . . . on the internet.’”233
Moreover, the question whether or not a parent can voluntarily waive
their child’s First Amendment rights was thoroughly analyzed by both the
district and circuit court234 and the Rules were part of the record in the

229. See Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043 (affirming the Third Circuit’s holding in B.L. but
disagreeing “with the reasoning of the Third Circuit’s panel majority”).
230. Id. at 2045.
231. Id. at 2051, 2054–55 (Alito, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., concurring).
233. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2020),
aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
234. See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 437–38
(M.D. Pa. 2019); B.L., 964 F.3d at 192–94.
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Supreme Court.235 However, these issues were not even mentioned by the
majority or concurrence, much less analyzed.236 B.L.’s speech occurred
off-campus, before the first game of the cheerleading season, and ultimately
did not amount to a substantial disruption of the learning environment. Still,
her comments were recognized as crude,237 they were undeniably critical of
the cheerleading squad, as well as the coach,238 and were posted after cheerleading tryouts culminated for the start of the season.239 At a minimum, the
type of speech at issue in B.L. significantly undermined the coach’s authority and directly impacted delicate team dynamics. The B.L. Court seemed
to agree with this premise, but still bemoaned the fact that B.L. had been
suspended from the cheerleading team for an entire school year, rather than
merely benched for her conduct.240
Ultimately, participation in athletics has traditionally been regarded as
a “privilege” and not a right,241 with the regulation of an athlete’s behavior
primarily residing within the discretion of school officials, not a court.242
B.L. flips this notion on its head and calls into question a swath of conduct
that has not typically been considered a constitutional question.243 This
235. See, e.g., Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043 (citing to the appellate record).
236. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the fact that B.L. participated as a school cheerleader as an extra-curricular activity at her school was given “little
apparent significance” in the majority’s decision).
237. See id. at 2056 (Alito, J., concurring).
238. Cf. id. at 2061 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he purpose and effect of B.L.’s speech
was ‘to degrade the [program and cheerleading staff]’ in front of ‘other pupils,’ thus having
‘a direct and immediate tendency to . . . subvert the [cheerleading coach’s] authority.’” (alteration in original) (citing Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 120 (1859)).
239. Id. at 2043.
240. See id. at 2057–58 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Schools may assert that parents who send
their children to a public school implicitly authorize the school to demand that the child
exhibit the respect that is required for orderly and effective instruction, but parents surely do
not relinquish their children’s ability to complain in an appropriate manner about wrongdoing, dereliction, or even plain incompetence.” (first citing Brief for College Athlete Advocates as Amicus Curiae at 12–21, Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (No. 20-255); and then
citing Brief for Student Press Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae at 10–11, 17–20, 30, Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (No. 20-255))).
241. E.g., B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir.
2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
242. Id. at 193.
243. Compare Johnson ex rel. S.J. v. Cache Cnty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1321
(D. Utah 2018) (reasoning that “there is no constitutional right to participate in an extracurricular activity[,]” and holding that “[b]y choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ [students] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation higher than that imposed on students
generally, [and] have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges”) (alterations in original) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)) with
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quagmire has a chilling effect on student speech and leaves coaches and
administrators with little guidance on how to develop enforceable athletic
codes of conduct in the modern digital world.
CONCLUSION
“[A]lthough schools perform ‘important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,’ there are ‘none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.’”244 As Parts I and II demonstrate, the Tinker doctrine simply does not offer insight into the complex student speech issues
facing public school officials today.245 However, as Part III detailed, a body
of circuit court caselaw emerged during the 2010’s to fill the void left by
the Supreme Court.246 Ultimately, as Parts IV and V explained, granting
certiorari in B.L. allowed the Court to paint with a broad brush and still punt
on the deeper off-campus student speech questions that persist in American
public schools.247 Future student speech cases are likely to play out differently and will require more discrete legal analysis.248
For now, the parameters of off-campus student speech are still not
well-defined and remain constrained only by the pace of social media development and the imagination of school-age children.249 On this new
B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (disagreeing with Johnson’s holding, finding the approach in
Johnson akin to “put[ting] the constitutional cart before the horse” by “assum[ing] all student
athlete speech is ipso facto less protected” which “muddies the First Amendment analysis,
and conflates it with Due Process analysis” (citing Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 605
(6th Cir. 2007))). Notably, these cases highlight the delicate intersection between a student’s
First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the student’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process.
244. B.L., 964 F.3d at 177 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
245. See supra Part I, II.
246. See supra Part III.
247. See supra Part IV, V.
248. See supra Part V.
249. One of the biggest emerging issues for off-campus student speech is viral “Tik Tok”
challenges, some of which increasingly threaten staff and students. See, e.g., Asha C. Gilbert, Some Students Face Charges for the ‘Slap a Teacher’ Challenge. Now Schools are
Issuing Warnings., USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2021, 10:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/sto
ry/news/nation/2021/10/08/slap-teacher-tiktok-challenge-condemned-tiktok-and-schools/
6048654001/ [https://perma.cc/6X8V-6SGB] (“New TiKTok viral ‘smack-a-teacher
challenge’ encourages students to hit their teachers[.]”); Hannah Natanson & Laura Meckler,
School Threats and Social Media Hoaxes are Forcing Closures, Time-Consuming Investigations, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/12/20/school-threats-oxford-shooting-tiktok/
[https://perma.cc/HE8S-2UJT]
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digital frontier, B.L. occupies but one end of the modern student speech
spectrum, with a myriad of areas in-between the hedges, ripe for litigation
in a new post-pandemic world.

(noting recent increases in school shooting threats on social media pages caused many school
districts to take action by cancelling classes or switching to online learning for the day).
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